continues during conflicts as well, with parties involved seeking ways to either end the confrontation or to reduce the ultimate costs incurred by those involved in the dispute.
The history of such interactions and processes is not new: tribal structures as well as Greek city-states engaged in what can be safely identified as diplomatic engagements.
The modern understandings of diplomacy, however, date back to the Italian traditions of diplomatists who communicated the views and opinions of their respective sovereigns to others. Building on these traditions, diplomatic institutions and traditions have emerged in parallel to the rise of state as the main unit of global politics. Diplomacy has been accepted and acknowledged as the domain in which a state operates and communicates its views to other states. The process occurs against the backdrop of the balance of power: the relative equilibrium or the absence of it determines the tenor of diplomatic exchanges as well as the issue areas covered by states.
Interfaith dialogue, in contrast, operates in the realm of beliefs and ideas of sacredness. The aim of the dialogue is essentially not to eliminate or reduce conflict between followers of different religious traditions but rather to promote an acceptance of difference. This is essentially due to the fact that religion invokes and evokes a belief and a fundamental commitment to notions of truth and sacred. Followers of different religious traditions view human place and its relationship to the sacred differently. Instead of establishing the primacy of one fundamental commitment over another, therefore, interfaith dialogue focuses on finding spaces where mutual coexistence is possible.
Traditionally the established religious institutions of different faiths had dominated the process. Religious clergy engaged in intellectual debates to establish the validity of religious views held by each other. Sovereigns representing different religious traditions often supported them in these processes. Sometimes these sovereigns also coopted followers of other religions into their state structures as advisors and ministers. This enlarged the space in which ideas and practices of coexistence were developed. The Abbasids, for instance, employed and promoted Jewish and Christian scientists and artists. Similarly, Emperor Akbar actively engaged Hindu advisors as a mechanism of building interfaith links with the ultimate aim of strengthening the Mughal Empire.
Gradually, however, the interfaith dialogue shifted primarily to the non-state sphere.
Societal groups (including those from religious denominations) engaged in discussions and activities to build understanding across faith boundaries. During the post Second World War era, therefore, the agency of interfaith dialogue rested with non-state actors who primarily engaged groups in their local areas. In the Nuba mountains of Sudan, for example, Christians and Muslims lived together peacefully with their respective leaders showing tolerance and active cooperation with each other. A Christian built both the mosque and church in the region (Flint, 1995) . Similarly, in Indonesia the syncretic traditions continued to provide the basis on which Muslim, Christian and Hindu communities coexisted in the largest Muslim state. The increased frequency of interfaith initiatives in the societal sector also contributed to some governmental leaders to begin to focus on the need to build bridges across civilisational lines. Prince Hasan bin Talal of Jordan took the lead in this process.
Apart from emphasising the need to build understanding across religious divides, he established an Institute which encourages the exchange of information between different groups (ArabicNews.com, 1998) . Prince Charles in Britain adopted a similar approach by supporting the Oxford Centre for Islamic Studies. President Khatami of Iran also floated the idea of a Dialogue of Civilisations with an emphasis on cross-cultural understandings.
The process gained momentum after the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United
States. The US-led war on terror and the increased focus on Muslim militancy created fear and a discourse of the west targeting Islam. The necessity to counter such discourse as a necessary corollary to engaging Muslim states and societies in countering terrorism contributed to a new found preference for interfaith dialogue among state actors. Keen to highlight the appreciation that the United States was aware of the diversity among Muslims and was only targeting militants, Washington took the lead in engaging Muslim leadership. In addition to meeting leaders from the American Muslim community, the Bush administration also set the tradition of diplomats promoting themselves as agents of This new blurring of the boundaries between the traditional roles of diplomats and interfaith organizations occurred in other countries as well. The process was aided by two parallel trends: western liberal democracies (including Australia) also wanted to reinforce their understanding of the nuanced differences among Muslims. At the same time, governments in Muslim majority states sought to legitimise their participation in the war on terror and counter allegations that they had become partners in a western agenda of subjugating Muslims. Keen to alter the domestic balance between radicalised and moderate population, they opted for a role as bridge builders across religious divides.
This complementarity of interests resulted in some low-key interaction among members of Muslim majority states with those from western liberal societies. In some cases, countries like Australia engaged some Muslim representatives to participate in interfaith dialogue at the regional level. The process invariably involved diplomatic institutions that had previously not specifically acknowledged the role of religion.
The relative quiet diplomacy was combined with more overt and symbolically significant references to the need for interfaith understanding. After the terrorist attacks (Fraerman, 2004; BBC, 2004) . The alliance was to serve as a mechanism for "deepening political, economic, cultural and educational ties" between the two civilisations. Then UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, formally endorsed the project in iii Once the cartoons were published, the dominant argument remained one of supporting freedom of speech in western secular societies without fear of retribution. In Denmark specifically, it was argued, democratisation and the introduction of the parliamentary system had allowed Danes the freedom to publish their ideas "in print, in writing, and in speech" subject to them being held responsible in a court of law. But more broadly, it was argued that the European Convention on Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights also endorsed these rights (cited in Wikipedia, 2006) . Coupled with the focus on secularism, it was claimed, "the West" had moved to a stage where making fun of religious views and sensitivities was considered acceptable. Newspapers in western societies referred to this view as justification of their decision to reprint the cartoons as the controversy entered the second phase. Paradoxically, the controversy also established the limits to the ability of nonstate actors to control the direction of events related to inter-faith issues. Having circulated the cartoons and the coverage of discriminatory acts and speeches by Danish civil society groups, the imams lost control of the response in the second phase. As the demonstrations turned violent and western newspapers continued to either reprint the cartoons or express an intention to do so, the group of Danish imams who had publicised the caricatures softened their demands. The call for an apology was replaced with demands that respect for Prophet Mohammad be restored and that he be described "as the man he really was in history, and that he gets the respect he deserves" (Gudmundsson, 2006) . But the ferocity of the demonstrations prompted Jyllands-Posten to soften its stand as well. After initially refusing to apologise for publishing the cartoons, the editorin-chief, Carsten Juste (2006), issued an apology on 30 January 2006 arguing that "the drawings were not intended to be offensive, nor were they at variance with Danish law".
But he admitted that the cartoons had "indisputably offended many Muslims" and apologised for it without any qualification. He went on record that the cartoons did not constitute part of a campaign against Muslims in Denmark and the rest of the world:
"Because of the very fact that we are strong proponents of the freedom of religion and because we respect the right of any human being to practice his or her religion, offending anybody on the grounds of their religious beliefs in unthinkable to us. That this happened was, consequently, unintentional." (Juste, 2006) The apology was accepted by Muslims in Denmark indicating that they were prepared to move into a new stage of reconciliation and building bridges between Muslims and the wider Danish society. But, despite these exchanges and announcements, the demonstrations did not subside. If anything, they continued unabated with the death toll mounting. It was obvious that an interfaith issue, once raised by societal groups, could become hostage to emotions. Political groups, as was the case in Pakistan, could also exploit these emotions as part of their own machinations (Khan, 2006) . Ultimately it was only when the anger subsided that the situation came under control.
BUSINESS INTERESTS AND INTERFAITH DIALOGUE
The cartoon controversy also brought into focus the role of business interests as Within days, dairy products from Denmark and Norway were withdrawn from supermarkets in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates. In some cases, the shelves containing dairy products from these countries were cordoned off with a sign "Danish Products". In others, the products were removed with signage "Danish products were here" (Arla Foods, 2006a ).
The boycott seriously affected the exports from Denmark and Norway. Arla Foods has remained an active diplomatic agent. While relying heavily upon cyberspace and print-media, the company has continued to reaffirm its commitment to interfaith dialogue. Parallel to an advertising campaign to recover the lost economic grounds, it has actively supported humanitarian initiatives in the Middle East. Importantly, it has expressed its intentions "to support activities aimed at creating greater understanding between the world's religions and cultures" (Arla Foods, 2006d) . Such a shift in emphasis from purely business interests to acceptance of the significance of interfaith dialogue indicates that the agenda of new diplomats is also expanding. In an era of technological advances and increased globalisation, these agents are emerging as nontraditional agents of diplomacy in areas of religious understanding.
DIPLOMACY AND INTERFAITH: WHITHER NOW?
The Civil society groups and diplomatic institutions, in other words, need to cooperate if the agenda of interfaith dialogue is to be successfully implemented.
The notion of interfaith dialogue, however, needs to be broadened beyond might have contributed to some resolution earlier than was the case. Essentially, the controversy has highlighted the need to revisit the logic underlying the dialogues: instead of appropriating "the truth", all those engaged in interfaith dialogue need to accept that our "Truths" are mere truths for those who view the reality and the world differently.
Developing such an approach requires exposure to other religious and cultural traditions.
Such a change, in turn, depends upon developing long-term strategies that enable people of all religions to interact and learn from each other. It also depends upon accepting that such knowledge is not the route to establishing superiority of one faith/belief system over another.
In the short term, the growing relevance of religion in world politics, magnified through the cartoon controversy, suggests that both diplomatic and governance institutions will increasingly have to deal with future controversy centring round different notions of sacred as well debates on secularism vs religious beliefs. Diplomats need to be trained in religious and cultural diversity, as well as the nuanced differences within religious traditions. This does not supersede the traditional emphasis on issues of "high politics". Instead, diplomatic training programmes could help those who engage in the art of communication and resolution and management of conflicts, to appreciate the blurring of lines state and non-state spheres. Such understanding would attune them to emerging fault lines linked to religious or cultural beliefs before they result in conflicts. Without such training, we may continue to witness cycles of religion-related conflicts and crises that we cannot afford.
Endnotes
i Shahadah is the primary declaration of faith by Muslims which states that 'There is no God but Allah, and Prophet Mohammad is God's messenger'.
ii Niqab refers to a particular form of veiling that completely covers a woman's face except for her eyes.
iii Later, Flemming Rose provided a detailed account for his decision to commission these cartoons in terms of a preference for cultural inclusivity of Muslims. See Flemming Rose 
